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issue: close wage paths should imply close benefit paths even at real wage shocks. 
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A már megállapított nyugdíjak bérek vagy árak szerinti 
indexálása 
 
SIMONOVITS ANDRÁS 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A már megállapított nyugdíjak bérek vagy árak szerinti indexálása 
  
A kezdőnyugdíjakat általában az átlagos béremelkedés ütemével valorizálják, de a 
már megállapított nyugdíjak indexálása térben és időben váltakozva, követheti a 
béreket, az árakat és kombinációjukat. Egy egyszerű együtt élő évjárati modellt 
készítünk, amelyben jól vizsgálhatjuk a már megállapított nyugdíjak indexálását, 
hangsúlyozva egy elhanyagolt kérdést: közeli kereseti pályáknak közeli nyugdíj-
pályákat kell adniuk, még jelentős reálbér-sokkok esetén is. Ezt a robusztussági 
ismérvet csak a bérindexálás elégíti ki, de ez a járadékszorzó megfelelő csökkentését 
igényli. Ha minimalizálni akarjuk jövedelem-újraelosztást a rövid várható 
élettartamú, alacsony keresetű állampolgároktól a hosszú várható élettartamú, magas 
keresetűek felé, akkor degressziót kell alkalmaznunk a kezdőnyugdíjaknál. 
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1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, almost all over the developed world, initial public pensions have been
indexed (valorized) to the economy-wide average wages, but pensions in progress have
been indexed to prices, average wages and various combination of prices and average
wages—varying across countries and periods. Indexing pensions is only a technical
measure in the short run, but it can be very important in the long run. This is especially
true when the public pension (paid as unisex indexed life annuity) replaces a large part
of the previous earnings. In my opinion, in the pension literature, indexing pensions
has not received the attention which it deserves. Perhaps it is not an accident that in
his excellent AEA Presidential lecture, Peter Diamond had to relegate the problem into
a footnote (Diamond 2004, p. 7. ftn. 24):
“Mandatory annuitizition in a social security program raises the interesting question
of how a monthly benefit should vary over time—with prices, wages, and possibly other
variables such as rates of return. Relevant for this issue are the age structure of opti-
mized expenditures, the relative importance of both real and relative consumption, and
the allocation of risk bearing between the elderly and the rest of population. Currently
[in the US in 2004, A.S.], the benefits in force are increased for inflation as measured
by the CPI. While this is a reasonable solution, I suspect it would be better, on a rev-
enue neutral basis, to have lower initial benefits that then grew faster (for example as a
weighted average of prices and wages). This would help more the longer-lived than the
shorter-lived but the eÆect on expected lifetime income distribution could be partially
adjusted by changing the benefit formula.”
Barr and Diamond (2008) devoted a whole chapter (Chapter 5) to this multi-
dimensional problem: they separately discussed indexing initial and continued bene-
fits by dividing the pension period into two subperiods, answering some issues raised
by Diamond (2004). Very few countries use and very few economists favor indexing
initial pensions to prices (namely, President’s Commission, 2001, p. 84, model 3 and
Biggs, Brown and Springstead, 2005). On the other hand, both practices and opinions
are divided whether pensions in progress should be indexed to wages or prices or their
combination. Therefore we confine our attention to indexing benefits in progress and
study the problem with a multicohort rather than a two-generation overlapping model.
Apart from Theorem A.1 in Appendix A, in this paper we avoid combined indexation,
and suggest that indexation to wages (similar to a point system—see Appendix A—or
Nonfinancial Defined Contribution) is superior to indexation to prices, especially when
a real wage shock hits the economy.
In the short run, in a country with smooth real wage dynamics, the method of
indexing pensions in progress is almost irrelevant. With an annual consumer price
index of 102 and a nominal wage index of 104, at first sight it is not too interesting if
the nominal pensions are increased by 2 or 4%, or their arithmetic average, by 3%. A
typical pensioner, however, spends about 20 years in retirement, therefore the annual
1–2% diÆerences become 20–40% diÆerences at the end and 10–20% deviations during
the whole period. The latter diÆerence manifests itself both at the macro and the
micro levels. But even in the well-designed US Social Security system, the correction
of an earlier indexation error created so-called notch babies: cohorts retiring just after
1977 and born after 1916 received much lower benefits than slightly earlier cohorts (e.g.
Krueger and Pischke, 1992).
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In another country where average real wages may increase or decrease by 5–10% a
year, with a relative freedom from the also fluctuating GDP’s growth rate, indexation
matters even in the short-run. For example, Table B.1 in Appendix B shows turbulent
real net wage and benefit dynamics in Hungary. To focus on two events: those Hungar-
ians, who retired in 2017, 2018 or 2019 received pensions in real terms higher by 7, 18
and 28% (cumulated real growth rates of wages, respectively) than those, who—with
similar wage paths—retired in 2016. In contrast, price-wage indexation plus extra mea-
sures preserved robustness in 2001–2003, when real wages also grew quickly, close wage
paths implied close benefit paths.
As Table B.2 shows, real net wage hikes have not been limited to Hungary; in
a number of other countries, growth rates of real net wages wildly oscillated. Even
between 2014 and 2017, cumulated wage hikes in Latvia and Lithuania amounted to
20.8 and 17.7%, respectively. The impact of wage turbulence on benefits in the foregoing
and similar countries needs further inquiries. A very recent example: in July 2019, the
Romanian parliament enacted a 60% raise of the average pensions by 2020! Therefore
indexing pensions deserves the attention of both theoretical and applied economists.
The main message of the paper is as follows: the only method to achieve robustness is
to raise pensions in progress by the economy-wide wage growth rate, shortly: indexing to
wages. (The German point system and the Swedish NDC take into account population
aging, too.) At the same time, this type of indexation makes the necessary restraint
with the initial benefits more visible and prefers those living longer (females and higher
earners); moreover, it weakens the incentives to retire later. Finally, in a country,
where the pension system is proportional (equivalently: earnings-related) and benefits
in progress are indexed to wages, some form of a flat component is inevitable. At
this point I must admit that between 2010 and 2017 I also accepted the prevailing
wisdom in Hungary: only pure price indexing is politically feasible in the long run. The
preservation of combined indexation or the return to pure wage indexation would have
required the simultaneous reduction of accrual rate (which connects the lifetime wages
to the initial benefit)—deemed unrealistic then!
In this paper, we use the framework of overlapping cohorts with a stationary pop-
ulation. In the macrosections, each cohort is represented by a single individual, whose
real net earnings vary with years. Under indexation to wages, perhaps after a transition
period, the benefits become independent of the age of the beneficiary and follow the
wage dynamics through the (total) accrual rate.
What happens under the more popular indexation to prices? Referring to the ratio
of the average benefits to the average wages as the average replacement ratio (sometimes
called benefit ratio), we show that the higher the time-invariant real net wage growth
rate, the lower the average replacement ratio. We mention two consequences: (i) low
average replacement ratio implies relative poverty among the pensioners and (ii) lack
of robustness: a real net wage hike, separating two subsequent cohorts, may transform
two close wage paths (diÆering only in the start and the end years) into distant benefit
paths.
Returning to the study of wage indexing, note that the representative individuals
can be simply replaced by multi-type cohorts with varying wages, life expectancies and
fragmented labor careers but by assuming time-invariant and type-invariant growth
rates of real wages. (Arbitrary wage paths are relegated to Appendix A.)
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A short review of the relevant literature follows. Feldstein (1990) created a special
model of two overlapping generations of pensioners (plus a third generation of workers)
and studied the socially optimal age structure of the US Social Security benefits—
regardless of any social custom. Simonovits (2003, Section 14.4) modeled the interco-
hort impact of replacing wage indexing by price indexing in an annual rather than a
decade model of Feldstein (1990) or Barr and Diamond (2008). Legros (2006) analyzed
the interaction of indexation and lifetime redistribution. Lovell (2009) dissected the
inconsistencies in the US Social Security rules.
Perhaps Auerbach and Lee (2011) is closest to the target of our study. They created
a stochastic simulation model to analyze how public pension structures spread the risks
arising from demographic and economic shocks across generations. Starting from the
qualitative features of the US, the Swedish and the German public systems, they com-
pare various sustainable systems. “Using a horizontal equity index, [they] also compare
the diÆerent systems’ performance in terms of how neighboring generations are treated”
(Auerbach and Lee, 2011, p. 16). Nevertheless, the two models are utterly diÆerent.
Theirs is a very sophisticated model, studying the long-run stochastic behavior of the
pension system, considering very slow average real wage growth (of 1%/year). Ours is
a very rudimentary model, concentrating on the real wage shocks (of order 10%/year)
occasionally hitting certain emerging economies.
Weinzierl (2014) analyzed the impact of various price indices on the US Social Secu-
rity system. Jaravel (2019, p. 715) demonstrated that “in the United States from 2004
to 2015... annual inflation for retail products was 0.661 ... percentage points higher for
the bottom income quintile relative to the top income quintile.” Knell (2018) gave a
deep critique of various versions of cohort-specific NDC rules (Holzmann and Palmer,
eds. 2006) with rising life expectancy. We have to underline that for technical reason,
we skip the very serious threat to any pension system, namely the population aging,
resulting from the simultaneous rise in life expectancy and fall in fertility (below the
critical value of 2.1).
At this point, we have to consider the issue of lifetime redistribution in the pension
system. Since 2000, several economists have documented that the apparently progres-
sive US Social Security system (with steeply declining marginal accrual rates) is only
weakly progressive on a lifetime basis, because life expectancy at retirement is a steeply
increasing function of the lifetime wages (e.g. Liebmann, 2002). Recently there is a
growing concern for this tendency which is strengthening all over the world. Among
others, Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008), The National Academy ... (2015), Chetty, Step-
ner and Abraham (2016), Auerbach et al. (2017); Ayuso, Bravo and Holzmann (2017)
reconsidered this problem on newer data. Simonovits (2018, Section 14.4) returned to
Diamond’s concern: the impact of wage index weight (i.e. the share of the wage index
in the combined wage–price index) on the redistribution from the short-lived low-paid
to the long-lived high-paid. Palmer and Zhao (2019) surveyed various issues of calcu-
lating life expectancy and indexing pensions in progress including its interaction with
income-dependent life expectancy.
It is hardly discussed in the literature that the type of indexation also influences
the choice of the retirement age. As an outlier, Simonovits (2019) modeled Female40,
a seniority retirement system (in force in Hungary since 2011) which allowed females
with eligibility of 40 years to retire without actuarial deduction. From the start this
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system unduly punished females with slightly shorter careers. Moreover, it became a
boomerang due to price indexing and real net wage hike: since 2016, a large share of
new beneficiaries would have received greater lifetime benefits if they had retired later.
This is the case where two wrong incentives, namely Female40 and excessive real wage
rise counteract.
Schookkaert, Devolder, Hindriks and Vandbroucke (2018) discussed a related model
of the point system which is equitable and sustainable. Their model is more elaborate
than ours, especially that it contains a general demographic block and a sophisticated
blend of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) principles for Belgium. But
the foregoing model neglects a basic concern of the present paper: fragmented careers
(Augusztinovics and Ko¨llo˝, 2008; Simonovits; 2018, Section 9.4 ). Future research should
combine the two approaches.
OECD (2019) gave a critical survey on the Hungarian pension policy and has for-
mulated interesting proposals on indexation of initial and continued benefits. Figure
1.2 (on p. 84) demonstrated that using a 3- or a 10-year moving average of economy-
wide wages in valorization would smooth the wild fluctuations in the real values of the
Hungarian initial benefits. Figure 1.16 (on p. 99) showed the widening gap between
expenditures under indexation to wages and prices starting in 2017, ending in a 3%point
diÆerence in terms of GDP in 2070 in a typical country like Hungary.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the wage
and price indexing rules at a macrolevel, respectively. Section 4 generalizes the wage
indexing to multi types and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A considers the point
system for individual real net wage paths diÆering from the average path and combined
indexation. Appendix B displays selected statistics on real wage and benefit dynamics.
2. Indexing to wages (macro)
All wages and benefits will be calculated at constant prices. We work with a very simple
dynamic framework of overlapping cohorts with stationary population; especially simple
in Sections 2 and 3, where each cohort will be represented by a single person. The
representative person works S years and then spends T years in retirement, S and T
are positive integers, close to 40 and 20, respectively. While working, the real net wage
is independent of her age but depends on the calendar year.
We shall make the simplest assumption on benefits. The initial pension benefit is
proportional to the current net wage vt:
bt = Øvt, t = 1, 2, . . . , (1)
where Ø is called the total accrual rate (or quite confusingly, replacement ratio—because
under certain conditions, it shows the replacement of the last wage by the first bene-
fit). For the sake of utmost simplicity, in (1) we neglect the usual one-year-lag in
valorization. We shall derive the general formula for arbitrary individual wage paths
in Appendix A. We shall also show that (1) is not only a final pay scheme but a good
macro approximation of indexation of initial benefits.
In this Section, the benefits in progress are indexed to wages, i.e. every year the
government raises these benefits according to the rationally expected time-variant net
wage growth coe±cient gt = vt/vt°1. We have then
4
Theorem 1. Under wage indexing, the initial benefit and—regardless of the years
elapsing since retirement—the benefits in progress are equal to each other and are
proportional to the current net wage: (1).
Proof. Consider first the worker who retired in year t° 1, her initial benefit was
equal to bt°1 = Øvt°1. Due to indexation to wages, in year t, her resulting benefit in
progress is equal to gtØvt°1 = Øgtvt°1 = Øvt = bt. By mathematical induction, the
same applies to workers who retired 2, . . . , T ° 1 years before t.
To highlight the impact of indexation on robustness, we create Table 1. The left
half of Table 1 displays the life paths of two cohorts starting to work in years 0 and
1, respectively; under wage indexing (the right half will be used in Section 3). Their
wage and benefit paths only diÆer at the start and the end. The diÆerences arise in
cohort 0’s first wage v0 and benefit bvS = ØvvS and in cohort 1’s last wage vS and
benefit bvS+T = ØvvS+1, otherwise the corresponding wages and benefits are equal. (To
avoid confusion, here we distinguish the variables of wage- and price-indexed systems
by superscripts v and p, respectively; but otherwise we may drop the superscripts.)
Table 1. Wages, pensions indexed to wages vs. prices: shifted paths
Indexation to wages Indexation to prices
Year Start at 0 Start at 1 Start at 0 Start at 1
t vt | bvt (0) vt | bvt (1) vt | bpt (0) vt | bpt (1)
0 v0 – v0 –
1 v1 v1 v1 v1
· · · · · · · · ·
S ° 1 vS°1 vS°1 vS°1 vS°1
S ØvvS vS ØpvS°1 vS
S + 1 ØvvS+1 ØvvS+1 ØpvS°1 ØpvS
· · · · · · · · ·
S + T ° 1 ØvvS+T°1 ØvvS+T°1 ØpvS°1 ØpvS
S + T – ØvvS+T – ØpvS
Next we calculate the undiscounted lifetime benefits of the two subsequent cohorts
introduced in Table 1:
Cv0 =
T°1X
t=0
bvS+t and C
v
1 =
TX
t=1
bvS+t,
hence their diÆerence is equal to
Cv1 °Cv0 = bvS+T °bvS = Øv(vS+T °vS) = Øv(GS+T °1)vS , where GS+T = vS+T /vS .
Turning to the balance condition of a pay-as-you-go wage-indexed pension system,
one needs distinguish real gross wage ut from real total labor compensation wt. To
connect the three wages, various tax and contribution rates are introduced. For the
time being, we assume that all rates are time-invariant.
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Employee’s contribution rates; pension: øE, health: µE. Employer’s contribution
rates; pension: øF: health: µF. Pension contribution rate ø = øE+øF. Personal income
tax rate: æ.
Though net wages are relevant at calculating replacement ratios, we should also
introduce total labor compensation wt and gross wage ut. By definition,
vt = (1° øE ° µE ° æ)ut and wt = (1 + øF + µF)ut,
where √ = 1° øE ° µE ° æ will denote the ratio of net to gross wage: vt = √ut.
Then the system’s balance condition is as follows:
øSut = TØvt.
We also introduce the dependency ratio µ, which is the ratio of the number of pensioners
to that of the workers. In our model, µ = T/S – time-invariant.
Considering a DB system, we have arrived to
Theorem 2. In a wage-indexed pension system, the balanced pension contribution
rate is equal to the product of the dependency ratio (µ) and of the gross accrual rate
(√Ø):
ø = µ√Ø.
Unfortunately, indexing to wages does not prevent the decline of the real value of
the benefit, when the average real wage drops: if vt < vt°1, then bt < bt°1. To avoid
this problem, between 1975 and 1980 the UK government chose a strange index: the
maximum of 1 and the real wage growth coe±cient gt. But this rule overindexed the
pensions in progress and was terminated (Barr–Diamond, 2008, Box 5.8, p. 77). In the
German point system, a discretionary decision practically excludes this accident. The
Swedish NDC system has a built-in balancing mechanism, to maintain sustainability.
A sensible solution to avoid any drop is as follows. The maximum rule is only a
conditional plan:
bct = max(Øvt, bˆt°1).
To phase-out excessive benefit rises, the government opens an account, the capital of
which is equal to Ft at the end of year t. The government introduces a feedback rule
with an appropriately chosen coe±cient ∑ > 0. To compensate for not reducing the
benefit in year t° 1 when vt°1 < vt°2, the raise in t is correspondingly diminished:
bˆt =
Ω
bct + ∑Ft°1 if bˆt°1 = bˆt°2;
bct otherwise.
The account’s dynamics is as follows:
Ft = Ft°1 + øSut ° T bˆt, F0 = 0.
To illustrate the operation of our rule, as a starting point, we use the following
parameter values as of Hungary, 2016. The dependency ratio is equal to µ = 20/35 =
0.571, the net replacement ratio is equal to Ø = 0.8. Since æ = 0.15, øE = 0.1 and µE =
0.08, therefore √ = 0.67, the pension contribution rate: ø = 0.571£ 0.67£ 0.8 = 0.306.
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To highlight the virtue of our proposal, Table 2 displays a real gross wage path
with wildly but regularly oscillating growth coe±cients: gt = 1.02 + (°1)t+10.04, i.e.
it alternates between 0.98 and 1.06, their geometric average being close to 1.02. With
the simple benefit rule (lacking the account), from year 2 to year 3, in terms of the
initial gross wage u0 = 1, the benefit drops from 0.565 to 0.554, etc. In the modified
system with a feedback coe±cient ∑ = 0.05, in odd years, the benefit remains the same
as previously, but in even years, its value is diminished with respect to the simple rule,
e.g. in year 4, 0.576 < 0.587. The account’s capital oscillates with narrow bounds.
Table 2. Wage-indexed pensions without or with an account
Gross Simple Modified
Year wage benefit benefit Account
t ut bt bˆt Ft
1 0.980 0.533 0.533 0.000
2 1.039 0.565 0.565 0.000
3 1.018 0.554 0.565 –0.226
4 1.079 0.587 0.576 0.000
5 1.058 0.575 0.576 –0.009
6 1.121 0.610 0.609 0.000
7 1.099 0.598 0.609 –0.235
8 1.164 0.633 0.622 0.000
9 1.141 0.621 0.622 –0.018
3. Indexing to prices (macro)
In this Section, we investigate the dynamics of pensions when benefits in progress are
indexed to prices. Its analysis is more complex than that of indexing to wages, because
we have to distinguish the benefits of pensioners retired in diÆerent years even after the
initial transition is over. Here we already allow for the one-year-lag in valorization. To
keep notations simple, now bt stands for benefit first granted in year t rather than the
common value of benefits paid in that year (in Section 2).
Newly awarded benefit with delay:
bt = Øvt°1, t = 1, 2, . . . . (2)
Invariant real value of benefit, started in year t° k:
bt°k = Øvt°k°1, k = 1, 2, . . . , T ° 1, t = 1, 2, . . . . (3)
Again, the predetermined benefits are set as if the system started in t = °T + 1:
b0 = Øv°1, b°1 = Øv°2, . . . , b°T+1 = Øv°T+2. (4)
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Figure 1 displays the relative depreciation of old benefits w.r.t. the new ones. For
simplicity, here we assume temporarily that the growth rate of the real wage is time-
invariant: vt = vt°1g and compare three benefit paths for real net wage growth rates
100(g ° 1) = 0, 2, 4. (The corresponding benefit paths b(k) are indexed by k = 0, 2, 4.)
The higher the growth rate, the stronger the depreciation: while for zero growth rate,
the benefit remains 80% of the real net wage in year of the start; for 4%, the benefit
drops to 38% of the foregoing wage at the end.
Before determining the new balance conditions, we introduce new concepts, allowing
for time-variant growth rates.
Total expenditures in year t:
Bt =
T°1X
k=0
bt°k.
The average benefit and average replacement ratio respectively are equal to
b¯t =
Bt
T
and ∞t =
b¯t
vt
. (5)
The average replacement ratio has a dual role: (i) it measures the average benefit
in terms of the net wage and (ii) it transforms the underlying DC to a DB system with
time-variant pension contribution rate øt. Note that in contrast, if benefits are indexed
to wages, then the average benefit ratio is equal to the accrual rate: ∞ = Ø.
First we illustrate theoretically and numerically the dependence of the average re-
placement ratio on the time-invariant wage growth coe±cient g. We shall need the
concept of equivalent number of years in retirement:
Tg =
TX
k=1
g°k =
1° g°T
g ° 1 < T for g > 1 and T1 = T.
Equivalence means that indexing to prices during T years costs the same as indexing to
wages during Tg years. With Tg’s help, we have
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Theorem 3. For a system where pensions in progress are price-indexed and real
wage growth coe±cient g is time-invariant, the corresponding time-invariant average
replacement ratio is given by the decreasing function
∞(g) = Ø
Tg
T
.
A well-known disadvantage of price indexing for the pensioners (which is an advan-
tage for the government) is as follows: the higher the real wage growth rate, the lower
the average replacement ratio with respect to a fixed accrual rate. The lag in valoriza-
tion (2) causes a small part of the drop, and the lagging of pensions in progress behind
the initial one in indexation (3) causes the large part of the drop. Quantitatively, with
T = 20 years spent in retirement, Table 3 demonstrates how the average replacement
ratio—in parallel with Tg—drops from ∞(0) = Ø = 0.8 through 0.654 to 0.498 as the
growth rate of the real net wages rises from 0 through 2 to 5%. The last column is
discussed later.
Table 3.
Average replacement ratio as a function of growth rate of real wages: price indexing
Growth rate Equivalent number Pension
of real of years Net average contribution
wages in retirement replacement ratio rate
100(g ° 1) Tg ∞ ø
0 20.0 0.800 0.306
1 18.0 0.722 0.276
2 16.4 0.654 0.250
3 14.9 0.595 0.228
4 13.6 0.544 0.208
5 12.5 0.498 0.191
Remark. Ø = 0.8.
We turn now to the dynamics of the average replacement ratio when the real wage
growth rate is time-variant. Starting with the tautological approach, (5) yields a trivial
formula:
∞t
∞t°1
=
b¯t
b¯t°1gt
.
In words: the growth coe±cient of the average replacement ratio is equal to the ratio
of the growth coe±cients of the average benefits and of the wages. While the formula
holds for any type of indexation; in pure indexing to wages, both sides simplify to 1.
Digging deeper, for pensions indexed to prices, we can express the dynamics of the
average benefits and of the average replacement ratio as functions of the underlying
wage growth coe±cients, respectively. The following recursion is to be used:
Bt = Bt°1 + bt ° bt°T . (6)
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Hence relying on (4), (5) and (6), the new average replacement ratio is given by
∞t =
b¯t
vt
=
b¯t°1
gtvt°1
+ Ø
vt°1 ° vt°T°1
Tvt
. (7)
To simplify (7), we use again the cumulated real wage growth coe±cient between
years t ° T and t: Gt = vt/vt°T which is also equal to the ratio of the next year’s
youngest and oldest pensions: Gt = bt+1/bt°T+1.
Theorem 4. For time-variant real net wage growth rates and price indexation, the
dynamic of average replacement ratio is given by
∞t =
∞t°1
gt
+ Ø
1°G°1t°1
gtT
, t = 1, 2, . . . . (8)
It is worth adding some explanation to (8). The first, dominant term represents past
average replacement ratio, scaled-down by the current real wage growth coe±cient. The
second term represents the impact of the entry of the youngest cohort and of the exit of
the oldest cohort, it is typically small, less than Ø/T = 0.03 in modulus, which pushes
up or down the first term.
Having this formula, we model the impact of an extraordinary real wage hike, similar
to that occurring in Hungary during 2016–2018, on the average replacement ratio. We
assume that there are two values of the real wage growth coe±cients (1 <)gm < gM,
the greater is reached in year t0 ° 1, t0, t0 + 1:
gt =
Ω
gm if t < t0 ° 1 or t > t0 + 1;
gM, otherwise.
Using the data of Figure 1, and noting that for gm = 1.02 and gM = 1.08, G0 = gTm,
Figure 2 depicts a stylized process. Starting from a steady state, the real wage explosion
reduces the average replacement ratio ∞0 = ∞(gm) = 0.654 to ∞3 = 0.557 and then ∞t
slowly returns to the start.
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We shall demonstrate that the temporary drop of the average replacement ratio
makes room for a similar temporary reduction of the contribution rate. But as the
replacement ratio eventually returns to its former value, so does the contribution rate.
To show this, we introduce
Total contributions in year t:
It = øtSut.
The new balance condition (It = Bt) is as follows:
øtSut = T b¯t = T∞tvt = T∞t√ut.
We have arrived to
Theorem 5. The balanced pension contribution rate is given by the product of the
dependency ratio (µ) and the average gross replacement ratio (√∞t):
øt = µ√∞t. (9)
Remarks. 1. As is known, (9) always holds, regardless of the form of indexation.
2. Note that following the current Hungarian practice, only the employer’s pension
contribution rate øFt varies in time, therefore √ is time-invariant. Correspondingly
øFt = µ∞t√ ° øE, where √ = 1° øE ° µE ° æ. (90)
3. The last column of Table 3 above shows the impact of the time-invariant real wage
growth rate on the balanced contribution rate, dropping from 30.6% (for stagnating real
wage) to 19.1% (for real wage rising by 5% per year).
Finally, we return to the undiscounted lifetime benefits of the two cohorts introduced
in Table 1 but now for the price-indexed ones:
Cp0 =
T°1X
t=0
bpS+t = Tb
p
S and C
p
1 =
TX
t=1
bpS+t = Tb
p
S+1,
hence their diÆerence is equal to
Cp1 ° Cp0 = TØ(vS ° vS°1) = TØ(gS ° 1)vS°1.
Table 4 presents the diÆerences of lifetime benefits in terms of the initial gross wage,
arising for a single-year real wage hike under wage- and price-indexing rules, respectively.
The wage hike runs from 0 to 10% in year S, just when the first cohort retired, otherwise
real wages grow by 2%. Note that under wage indexing, the diÆerence (given in terms
of the initial gross wage u0 = 1) grows moderately, while under price indexing, the
unadjusted diÆerence rises rather steeply, showing the lack of robustness.
Table 4. The diÆerences between subsequent cohorts’ lifetime benefits
Real wage hike 100(gS ° 1) % 0 2 4 6 8 10
Wage-indexed diÆ Cv1 ° Cv0 0.762 0.777 0.793 0.808 0.823 0.838
Price-indexed diÆ Cp1 ° Cp0 0 0.627 1.255 1.882 2.510 3.137
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4. Indexing to wages (micro)
In Sections 2 and 3, we demonstrated that at macrolevel, the only robust method—
meaning that close wage paths yield close benefit paths—is when benefits in progress are
indexed to wages. This requires, however, some political courage from the government
to (i) reduce the accrual rate Ø appropriately during rising dependency ratio (neglected
in the paper) and (ii) forsake temporary reduction of the contribution rate øt during a
real wage hike (see above). Moreover, at microlevel, indexing to wages has an unpleasant
side eÆect: since the life expectancies of various income groups widely diÆer, namely
higher earners live longer, therefore the faster the benefits increase, the stronger the
income redistribution from the shorter-lived to the longer-lived. We shall show how this
can be mitigated by the introduction of pension progression.
Working out the necessary changes, for the sake of simplicity, we neglect again the
time-variance of real wage growth rates, the problem of transition in indexation and
relax the assumptions of homogeneous wages and life expectancies. Let i be the index
of a wage group, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, fi > 0 be its relative frequency:
Pn
i=1 fi = 1 and Q is
the age of entry to work. We assume that the real wage of each group grows at the same
time-invariant rate as the average gross wage ut = gt°Q, therefore the corresponding
type-specific gross wage in year t is equal to the product of a time-invariant constant
!i (increasing in i) and of the average wage:
ui,t = !iut, where uQ =
nX
i=1
fi!i = 1. (10)
(In Appendix A, we shall cover the general case of type- and time-variant growth coef-
ficients gi,t.)
By assumption, everybody retires at age R = Q+ S, type i lives until Di = R+ Ti:
!i as well as Di is increasing, and
Pn
i=1 fiDi = D¯.
To eliminate cross-subsidization, one could have type-specific decreasing average
accrual rates Øi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) but it would change the order of benefits at the left-
and right-hand sides of the bending points. This is avoided by the use of decreasing
marginal accrual rates, and this diminishes redistribution in the US Social Security (cf.
Liebmann, 2002). Following Disney (2004), we approximate progression by the linear
combination of proportional and flat benefits. We shall keep average gross and net
wages in year t by ut and vt, respectively, and denote the share of proportional benefits
by Æ, 0 ∑ Æ ∑ 1.
The mixed benefits of wage class i are given by
bi,t = Ø[Ævi,t + (1° Æ)vt], i = 1, . . . , n. (11)
Simplifying the calculations, we retain stationary population. The balance condition is
now
øÆSut =
nX
i=1
fiTibi,t.
Take the weighted and doubly weighted average times spent in retirement, respectively:
T¯ =
nX
i=1
fiTi and T u =
nX
i=1
fiTi!i. (12)
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Obviously, T u > T¯ . Substituting (11) and (12) into the balance condition, yields another
balance equation:
øÆS = √
nX
i=1
fiTiØ[Æ!i + (1° Æ)], where √ = 1° øE ° µE ° æ.
Thus we have arrived to the generalization of Theorem 2.
Theorem 6. For pensions in progress indexed to wages and for heterogeneous wage
profile (!i) and times spent in retirement (Ti), the balanced contribution rate is given
by
øÆ =
Ø√[ÆT u + (1° Æ)T¯ ]
S
. (13)
Remark. As the proportional benefit’s share Æ decreases, so decreases the bal-
anced contribution rate.
We shall now analyze the income redistribution due to heterogeneous earnings and
life expectancies. Corresponding to the logic of the pay-as-you-go system, the type-
specific lifetime balance in year Q should be discounted by the real growth coe±cient g,
therefore it is defined by
zi,Q = øÆS!i °
DiX
k=R
g°(k°R)bi,k.
Using (11)–(12), the type-specific lifetime balance is given by
zi,Q = Æ(øÆS ° Ø√Ti)!i + (1° Æ)(øS!i ° Ø√Ti). (14)
As an illustration, we consider the traditional homogeneous life expectancies, where
Ti ¥ T¯ , i.e. T u = T¯ , i.e. (13) simplifies to ø = √Øµ, regardless of Æ. The type-specific
lifetime balance is then equal to
zi,Q = (1° Æ)Ø√µ(!i ° 1)T¯ ,
i.e. those who earn below the average (!i < 1), gain (zi,Q < 0), the others (!i ∏ 1) lose
(zi,Q ∏ 0).
Table 5 presents a more realistic but still simple numerical illustration. There are
three types diÆering in their relative gross wages: !1 = 0.5; !2 = 1 and !3 = 2.125;
their frequencies are f1 = 0.45, f2 = 0.35 and f1 = 0.2, keeping the average gross wage
at unity [(10)]. Let Q = 25 and R = 60, the corresponding life expectancies be D1 = 77,
D2 = 80 and D3 = 86.75 years, resulting in average life expectancy equaling to D¯ = 80
years. The lower the proportional share, the lower the contribution rate. In addition,
we display the type-specific lifetime balances. For a proportional system (Æ = 1), the
higher earners and longer-lived are the gainers (z3,Q < 0), the others are the losers; this
changes with decreasing Æ to 0.5. (For diÆerent parameter values, the picture would be
diÆerent.)
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Table 5. Progression, contribution rates and type-specific balances
Balanced Lifetime balance
Proportional contribution with life expectancy
share rate short medium long
Æ øÆ z1,Q z2,Q z3,Q
1.00 0.340 1.392 1.176 –5.190
0.75 0.331 –0.296 0.882 –0.877
0.50 0.323 –1.984 0.588 3.435
0.25 0.315 –3.672 0.294 7.748
0.00 0.306 –5.360 –0.000 12.060
Up to now we have left out the fragmentation of working careers (cf. Augusztinovics
and Ko¨llo˝, 2008) and here we make up this omission. A basic problem of most (but not
so much of the US) pension systems is that workers who have long lacunas in their labor
histories will receive rather low benefits with respect to those who have no lacunas. We
introduce the double-weighted expected contribution length:
Su =
nX
i=1
fi!iSi.
Now (13)–(14) modify respectively into
øÆ =
Ø√[ÆT u + (1° Æ)T¯ ]
Su
(130)
and
zi,Q = øÆSi!i ° Ø[Æ√!i + (1° Æ)]Ti. (140)
We could illustrate these formulas as well but we forsake it. We also skip the analysis
of variable retirement ages.
5. Conclusions
At the end of the main text, we draw some conclusions. We have demonstrated the
relative simplicity and fairness of indexing public pensions to wages. Even the adverse
impact of temporary drop of real wages on real benefits can be mitigated by an account.
We have also demonstrated that the apparently frugal price indexing has a number of
pitfalls: In addition to reducing the relative value of old benefits to current wages, it
also creates unjustified diÆerences between pension paths of cohorts whose retirement is
separated by a real wage shock. This anomaly favors wage indexing over price indexing,
but then the government cannot apply the forced reduction of contribution rate during
the real wage hike. Furthermore, the government has to weaken the side eÆect of wage
indexing, namely maximizing the perverse redistribution from low-earning short-lived
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citizen to high-earning long-lived ones. To mitigate this pitfall, the public has to rely
on progressive pensions.
Unfortunately, introducing progression often weakens the incentives to report wages.
Together with wage indexing, both may undermine the incentives to work longer and
strengthen those for early retirement. But the wage indexing is probably close to the
social optimum if supplemented with progression. The only remaining problem is: how
to phase it in?
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Appendix A. Valorization, indexation and point system
In the main text we avoided wage paths with type-specific real wage growth rates.
Now we make up this omission, also define combined wage-price indexing and the point
system.
Assume that a worker of type i, born in year 0 enters work at age Q and earns real
net wage vi,a at age a, a = Q, . . . , R° 1. Her initial pension is given as
bi,R = ±
R°1X
a=Q
GR°1,avi,a,
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where the valorization multipliers from year a to year R° 1 in real terms are equal to
GR°1,a =
vR°1
va
, a = Q, . . . , R° 1,
va being the economy-wide real wage in year a and ± denoting the marginal accrual
rate.
At this point we show that—apart from the 1-year lag—(1) is a good approximation
of the general formula. Indeed, for our representative worker, who at age a earns the
current average net wage va, the initial benefit is equal to
bR = ±
R°1X
a=Q
GR°1,ava = ±(R°Q)vR°1,
thus Ø = ±(R°Q).
Let ∂ be a real number between 0 and 1, to be called wage index weight. Then raising
the real wage growth coe±cient to this power, the previous benefit is multiplied by this
number to yield the new benefit in progress:
bi,a = bi,a°1g∂a, a = R+ 1, . . . , D ° 1.
The predetermined benefits are again given.
It is obvious that ∂ = 1, 1/2, 0 represent wage, wage-price and price indexing rules,
being in force in Hungary during the periods 1993–1999, 2000–2009 and 2010–, respec-
tively, as will be described in Table B.1 below.
At this point we turn from the DB to the DC system and fix ø rather than Ø. In
the framework of time-invariant real wage growth rates, we can now formulate Dia-
mond’s trade-oÆ between higher indexation and lower initial benefit mentioned at the
beginning. Introducing the wage-index-weight-dependent accrual rate Ø(∂) and the gen-
eralized equivalent years spent in retirement
Tg,∂ =
1° g(∂°1)T
g1°∂ ° 1 , ∂ < 1 and Tg,1 = T,
yields
Theorem A.1. For a time-invariant real wage growth coe±cient g and a given
average replacement ratio ∞, there is the following trade-oÆ between the wage index
weight ∂ and the accrual rate Ø(∂):
Ø(∂) = ∞
T
Tg,∂
.
Table A.1 displays the trade-oÆ between the wage index weight and the accrual rate
under a fixed contribution rate ø = 0.25 for long-run growth coe±cient g = 1.02. As
the wage index weight rises, so decreases the accrual rate from 0.8 to 0.653.
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Table A.1. Trade-of between the wage index weight and the accrual rate
Wage index weight ∂ 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Accrual rate Ø(∂) 0.800 0.760 0.723 0.688 0.653
Finally we outline the logic of a point system. In year t+ a, an i-type worker of age
a earns points
pi,a,t+a =
vi,a,t+a
vt+a
,
i.e. the ratio of her wage to the economy-wide average. Her cumulated points earned
up to retirement is equal to the sum of these points:
pi,R,t+R =
R°1X
a=Q
pi,a,t+a.
The value of one point in year t+ a, xt+a yields a benefit
bi,a,t+a = pi,t+a,Rxt+a, a = R, . . . ,Di ° 1.
Note that in the point system, there is neither wage indexing nor price indexing nor
their mixture; for example, denoting the cross-sectional profile in year t by (bi,a,t)a, the
point value xt is determined from a complex balance condition:
øSwt =
nX
i=1
fi
DiX
a=R
bi,a,t = xt
nX
i=1
fiTipi,R,t.
Appendix B. Selected statistics
This Appendix contains two sets of time series of Hungary and of several EU countries,
respectively.
Table B.1 displays the historical time series of the Hungarian developments during
1993–2018: the more so because the GDP and the net wage growth rates were very
turbulent, and indexation rules to wages, to wages and prices and to prices followed
each other, yielding oscillating net average replacement ratios. We inform the reader
on other factors in the last column. Just concentrating on the latest development, from
2015 to 2018, real net average wage grew by an astonishing 28% while the GDP only
grew by 10%, pensions (mostly price-indexed pensions in progress) only by 6%.
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Table B.1. Output, real wage and real pension dynamics: Hungary: 1993–2018
Net
Real growth rate of replace-
Year GDP net wage pension ment rate Comments
t 100(gy ° 1) 100(gv ° 1) 100(gb ° 1) ∞t
indexation to wages
1993 –0.8 –3.9 –4.6 0.603
1994 3.1 7.2 4.7 0.594 E: change in PIT
1995 1.5 –12.2 –10.1 0.619 change in delay
1996 0.0 –5.0 –7.9 0.593
1997 3.3 4.9 0.4 0.563
1998 4.2 3.6 6.2 0.578 E
1999 3.1 2.5 2.1 0.592
Swiss indexation (half wage+half price)
2000 4.2 1.5 2.6 0.591
2001 3.8 6.4 6.6 0.591 + raise
2002 4.5 13.6 9.8 0.573 E++ raise
2003 3.8 9.2 8.5 0.568 + 1 week pension
2004 4.9 –1.1 3.9 0.600 + 2 weeks pension
2005 4.4 6.3 7.9 0.611 + 3 weeks pension
2006 3.8 3.6 4.5 0.623 E + 4 weeks pension
2007 0.4 –4.6 –0.3 0.668
2008 0.8 0.8 3.4 0.691
2009 –6.6 –2.3 –5.7 0.672 no 13th month benefit
indexation to prices
2010 0.7 1.8 –0.9 0.651 E
2011 1.8 2.4 1.2 0.647
2012 –1.7 –3.4 0.1 0.670
2013 1.9 3.1 4.5 0.676 overindexation§§
2014 3.7 3.2 3.2 0.676 E+ overindexation
2015 2.9 4.3 3.5 0.668 overindexation
2016 2.1 7.4 1.4 0.637 start of wage explosion
2017 4.1 10.2 3.0 0.583 wage explosion continued
2018* 4.8 8.0 2.0 0.551 wage explosion ends?
Source: ONYF (2016, Table 1.3, p. 16), new data are added, *: forecast, E =
election, **: when the inflationary forecast was higher than the actual, the additional
benefit rise was not deducted.
Table B.2 displays selected statistics on real net wage growth in five EU countries
between 2001 and 2016, for one-earners without children. There is an ongoing debate
whether the o±cial Hungarian data (also used in valorization) are consistent or not to
the EU statistics. Column 2 of Table B.2 does not conform to column 3 of Table B.1,
either but their qualitative behavior are the same. Germany and Czechia stand out with
smooth wage growth. Latvia and Romania had wage growth data even more exotic than
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the Hungarian. It would be interesting to know how the pensions in progress in Latvia
and Romania reacted to them.
Table B.2. Growth of real net earnings in selected EU-countries,%
Year Hungary Germany Latvia Czechia Romania
2001 1.9 * 2.8 3.5 9.7
2002 10.8 1.0 4.3 5.3 –3.0
2003 10.1 –0.2 6.5 4.5 9.4
2004 –0.2 2.5 5.4 3.3 7.6
2005 4.7 –0.2 9.7 2.7 10.1
2006 2.6 –1.1 15.2 6.7 6.6
2007 –4.9 –2.1 18.3 3.7 15.5
2008 3.1 1.1 6.8 1.3 16.4
2009 1.1 0.3 –2.0 4.6 –1.5
2010 8.6 5.5 –2.6 0.5 1.4
2011 –4.1 0.1 –0.6 –0.3 3.9
2012 1.5 0.0 2.0 –0.8 –3.8
2013 2.6 –0.2 4.5 –1.6 4.2
2014 4.0 1.0 * 2.2 5.3
2015 3.7 1.5 7.5 2.2 11.5
2016 5.6 * * 2.5 *
Remark. Single person without children
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